The creation of the Task Force Philippines—a joint maritime defense coordination body involving the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines—represents a strategic and symbolic pivot toward collective deterrence against Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea (WPS). Within the volatile Indo-Pacific security landscape, this task force signals that the Philippines has transcended the “asymmetry trap” long exploited by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through its gray-zone strategy—a form of calibrated coercion operating below the threshold of war (Mastro 2019).
From a security standpoint, the Task Force serves as a credible deterrent. Deterrence theory emphasizes the role of multilateral force projection and joint interoperability as key to dissuading adversaries from escalating conflict (Schelling 1966; Nye 2020). The presence of coordinated naval patrols among Western powers and regional allies amplifies both the costs and risks of Chinese escalation. In the view of realists such as John Mearsheimer (2014), the logic of balance-of-power politics dictates that smaller states like the Philippines must rely on coalition-building to offset the capabilities of a hegemonic actor. The task force thus functions as a “defensive multiplier” that restores a degree of strategic equilibrium in the region.
China’s leadership perceives such multilateral arrangements as direct threats to its sovereign narrative—the idea that the South China Sea constitutes an intrinsic part of its “historical rights” (Zhao 2020). In Beijing’s calculus, the emergence of a Task Force Philippines—jointly operated with Western partners—constitutes a normative challenge to its regional dominance and may compel the PRC to recalibrate its tactics. As Andrew Erickson (2018) observes, China prefers to deal with Southeast Asian states bilaterally, where it can exercise economic leverage and political coercion. A multilateral naval presence in its near seas therefore dilutes that leverage and constrains its capacity for “salami-slicing” maneuvers—small, incremental assertions of control designed to avoid overt confrontation.
However, while the Task Force represents an immediate deterrent, it cannot, on its own, guarantee long-term sovereign resilience. The history of maritime disputes shows that external defense arrangements are most effective when anchored in domestic economic and political stability (Buzan and Wæver 2003). The Philippines’ persistent vulnerabilities—weak industrial capacity, political fragmentation, and dependency on foreign investment—create avenues for non-military coercion, which China has mastered through its comprehensive national power (CNP) strategy.
China’s modern strategic doctrine, articulated under Xi Jinping’s “Integrated National Strategy”, relies not only on military strength but also on economic statecraft—the manipulation of trade, infrastructure financing, and digital networks to influence political outcomes (Blackwill and Harris 2016). This is often referred to as “sharp power”, a form of influence that operates through economic penetration and elite capture rather than overt coercion (Walker and Ludwig 2017). If the Philippines remains economically fragile, China can bypass military confrontation and instead exploit domestic weaknesses—using economic inducements, disinformation campaigns, and political patronage to undermine Manila’s strategic autonomy.
In this sense, even the most sophisticated naval alliance cannot substitute for state capacity. As Huntington (1968) warned, political order is a prerequisite for national security; without it, even powerful militaries fail to protect sovereignty. The Philippine state must therefore complement the Task Force with sustained efforts to build economic independence, infrastructure modernization, and institutional integrity. A resilient domestic foundation would deny Beijing the opportunity to apply what some analysts term a “fragmentation strategy”—the deliberate exploitation of political disunity and economic dependency to achieve strategic objectives without firing a single shot (Doshi 2021).
Thus, the Task Force Philippines represents a critical but partial solution. It sends a clear deterrent message to Beijing: that aggression in the WPS will trigger collective response from a coalition of capable allies. Yet this deterrent will only endure if Manila secures internal sovereignty—by strengthening governance, attracting sustainable foreign capital, and cultivating economic resilience. The ultimate lesson of small-state security in great power politics is that external alliances can buy time, but only domestic strength can buy sovereignty.
References:
Blackwill, Robert D., and Jennifer M. Harris. War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft. Harvard University Press, 2016.
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Doshi, Rush. The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order. Oxford University Press, 2021.
Erickson, Andrew S. “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations.” Naval War College Review, vol. 71, no. 3, 2018.
Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press, 1968.
Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions.” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated Edition. W.W. Norton, 2014.
Nye, Joseph S. Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump. Oxford University Press, 2020.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, 1966.
Walker, Christopher, and Jessica Ludwig. Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence. National Endowment for Democracy, 2017.
Zhao, Suisheng. China’s Global Reach: Power and Influence in Asia and Beyond. Routledge, 2020.